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CONCLUSION .....................................................................................1068
This Article uses the September 2017 defamation decision in
Simmons v. American Media, Inc. as a springboard for examining
defamatory meaning and reputational injury. Specifically, it focuses
on cases in which judges acknowledge that plaintiffs have suffered
reputational harm yet rule for defendants because promoting the
cultural value of equality weighs against redress. In Simmons, a
normative, axiological judgment—that the law should neither
sanction nor ratify prejudicial views about transgender individuals—
prevailed at the trial court level over a celebrity’s ability to recover for
alleged reputational harm. Simmons sits at a dangerous intersection:
a crossroads where a noble judicial desire to reject prejudicial
stereotypes and to embrace equality collides head-on with an ignoble
reality in which a significant minority of the population finds a
particular false allegation (in Simmons, transgender status) to be
defamatory. This Article examines how courts historically determined
defamatory meaning and how once-defamatory per se statements
about sexual orientation are not always considered so today. When
viewed beyond a legal lens, however, research suggests transgender
individuals have not witnessed the same benefits of that altered
perspective. There is a key difference between attitudes about sexual
orientation and attitudes about sexual identity. The Article concludes
by proposing variables for courts to apply in future cases where a
dispute exists over whether an allegation is defamatory per se, rather
than leaving the decision to the discretion of judges untethered from
formal criteria.
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INTRODUCTION
In September 2017, California Superior Court Judge Gregory
Keosian1 dismissed weight-loss legend2 and aerobicizologist3 Richard
Simmons’ libel4 suit against the National Enquirer in Simmons v.
American Media, Inc.5 In doing so, Keosian tackled what he called
“an issue of first impression in California.”6 That question was
whether falsely stating a person is transgender naturally tends to
cause reputational harm.7 The judge ultimately concluded that “even
if there is a sizeable portion of the population who would view being
transgender as a negative,”8 he would “not validate those prejudices
by legally recognizing them.”9
Because Keosian held that falsely labeling someone transgender
was not defamatory per se,10 Simmons was forced under California

1. Keosian was appointed to the superior court in May 2002 by former
California Governor Gray Davis. Kimberly Edds, Davis Appoints Three Private
Practitioners to Superior Court, M ETROPOLITAN N EWS -E NTERPRISE (L.A.), May 23,
2002, at 1. As a litigator in private practice prior to his judgeship, Keosian focused
“on civil tort litigation and representing plaintiffs in personal injury cases.” Id.
Richard Simmons is not the only celebrity over whose case Keosian has presided. In
October 2014, for example, he dismissed the case of a woman who sued National
Basketball Association player Kris Humphries for allegedly giving her herpes.
Cheryl Johnson, Humphries May Sue Herpes Accuser, S TAR T RIB . (Minneapolis),
Oct. 23, 2014, at 2B.
2. See, e.g., Donna Gable, Simmons Drops by ‘Shade’ to Help Folks Drop
Pounds, USA T ODAY , Nov. 9, 1992, at 3D (calling Simmons a “weight loss guru”);
Jumpin’ Jack Cash, N.Y. P OST , Sept. 6, 2017, at 12 (dubbing Simmons an “enigmatic
fitness guru”).
3. Stanley Elkin, Talk Up! The First Amendment as an Art Form, G RAND
S TREET , Winter 1989, at 94, 101.
4. Under California law applicable in Simmons’ case, libel—along with
slander—is a subset of defamation. C AL . C IV . C ODE § 44 (West 2017). Libel, in turn,
is statutorily defined as “a false and unprivileged publication by writing, printing,
picture, effigy, or other fixed representation to the eye, which exposes any person to
hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or which causes him to be shunned or avoided,
or which has a tendency to injure him in his occupation.” Id. § 45.
5. Ruling at 1, Simmons v. Am. Media, Inc., No. BC660633 (Cal. Super. Ct.
L.A.
Cty.
Sept.
1,
2017)
[hereinafter
Simmons
Order],
https://www.scribd.com/document/358305250/Simmons-v-AMI-Ruling#from_embed.
6. Id. at 6.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 11.
9. Id. at 9.
10. Id. at 6; see also Hayes v. Smith, 832 P.2d 1022, 1024 (Colo. App. 1991)
(“Historically, defamation was actionable per se only if the defamatory remark
imputed a criminal offense; a venereal or loathsome and communicable disease;
improper conduct of a lawful business; or unchastity by a woman.”); 1 R OBERT D.
S ACK , S ACK ON D EFAMATION : L IBEL , S LANDER , AND R ELATED P ROBLEMS § 2:8.1
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law to demonstrate special damages in order to prevail.11 Special
damages, as defined by the relevant statute in Simmons, are
“damages that [the] plaintiff alleges and proves that he or she has
suffered in respect to his or her property, business, trade, profession,
or occupation, including the amounts of money the plaintiff alleges
and proves he or she has expended as a result of the alleged libel,
and no other.”12 Unfortunately for the fitness guru, he “introduce[d]
no evidence of any ‘special damages’ from the alleged defamation.”13
In fact, Simmons actually “appear[ed] to concede . . . that he did not
suffer any special damages.”14
Keosian, thus, dismissed Simmons’ lawsuit15 under California’s
anti-SLAPP16 statute.17 Adding pecuniary insult to alleged
(5th ed. 2012) (“A libelous or slanderous communication that, under the law of the
relevant jurisdiction, can support a cause of action without proof of special damages
is referred to as libel per se or slander per se, respectively. No concept in the law of
defamation has created more confusion.”); Robert D. Richards, Gay Labeling and
Defamation Law: Have Attitudes Toward Homosexuality Changed Enough to Modify
Reputational Torts?, 18 C OMM L AW C ONSPECTUS 349, 356 (2010) (“Defamation per
se is premised upon the notion that some statements are so inherently malevolent
that they, without need for further elaboration, expose the subject to scorn.”).
11. See Simmons Order, supra note 5, at 6 (concluding that “misidentification
of a person as transgender is not actionable defamation absent special damages”); see
also C AL . C IV . C ODE § 45a (West 2017) (“Defamatory language not libelous on its
face is not actionable unless the plaintiff alleges and proves that he has suffered
special damage as a proximate result thereof.”). The Supreme Court of California
explained more than half a century ago that “[t]he purpose of the rule requiring proof
of special damages when the defamatory meaning does not appear on the face of the
language used is to protect publishers who make statements innocent in themselves
that are defamatory only because of extrinsic facts known to the reader.” MacLeod v.
Tribune Publ’g Co., 343 P.2d 36, 43 (Cal. 1959).
12. C AL . C IV . C ODE § 48a(d)(2) (West 2017).
13. See Simmons Order, supra note 5, at 5.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1.
16. SLAPP is an acronym “standing for Strategic Lawsuits Against Public
Participation.” R OBERT D. R ICHARDS , F REEDOM ’ S : T HE P ERILOUS P RESENT AND
U NCERTAIN F UTURE OF THE F IRST A MENDMENT 4 (1998). Such lawsuits are “aimed
at preventing citizens from exercising their political rights or punishing those who
have done so.” Simpson Strong-Tie Co. v. Gore, 230 P.3d 1117, 1123 (Cal. 2010).
Anti-SLAPP statutes, in turn, are “laws enacted to deter strategic lawsuits
against public participation (SLAPPs), or lawsuits that plaintiffs bring principally to
chill the valid exercise of First Amendment speech and petition rights.” Lili Levi, The
Weaponized Lawsuit Against the Media: Litigation Funding as a New Threat to
Journalism, 66 A M . U. L. R EV . 761, 822 (2017). Anti-SLAPP statutes, although
varying in terms from state to state, “generally work in the same way: they provide
defendants a special, expedited procedure to seek a quick dismissal of the case, and
they install cost-shifting provisions that attempt to economically disincentivize the
filing of a frivolous suit.” Robert T. Sherwin, Evidence? We Don’t Need No Stinkin’
Evidence!: How Ambiguity in Some States’ Anti-SLAPP Laws Threatens to De-Fang a
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reputational injury, the judge also allowed the National Enquirer to
file for attorneys’ fees as the prevailing party under the anti-SLAPP
law.18 Those fees totaled more than $200,00019—a sum that
Simmons’ attorney Neville Johnson20 blasted in January 2018 as a
“billing fiesta”21 and “the kind of request that gives lawyers a bad
name.”22
The decision against the waggish workout buff was hailed by
some as a victory for the Lesbian Gay Bisexual Transgender Queer
(“LGBTQ”) community.23 Furthermore, it comports with multiple

Popular and Powerful Weapon Against Frivolous Litigation, 40 C OLUM . J.L. & A RTS
431, 433 (2017).
17. C AL . C ODE C IV . P ROC . § 425.16 (West 2017).
18. See Simmons Order, supra note 5, at 1; C AL . C ODE C IV . P ROC . §
425.16(c)(1) (West 2017) (providing that “a prevailing defendant on a special motion
to strike shall be entitled to recover his or her attorney’s fees and costs”).
19. Tim Kenneally, Richard Simmons Ordered to Pay National Enquirer’s
Legal Fees in Transgender Story Lawsuit, W RAP (Sept. 21, 2017),
https://www.thewrap.com/richard-simmons-ordered-to-pay-national-enquirers-legalfees-in-transgender-story-lawsuit/; Richard Simmons’ Enquirer Lawsuit May Cost
Him More than $220k, TMZ (Nov. 6, 2017), http://www.tmz.com/2017/11/06/richardsimmons-enquirer-lawsuit-attorneys-fees/.
20. In a 2004 profile, Johnson was described as “the man to whom many
plaintiffs now turn when it comes to suing the media” and who, along with Atlantabased L. Lin Wood, is “the go-to attorney for plaintiffs seeking redress for disparaged
reputations and privacy invasions.” Robert D. Richards & Clay Calvert, Suing the
Media, Supporting the First Amendment: The Paradox of Neville Johnson and the
Battle for Privacy, 67 A LB . L. R EV . 1097, 1098 (2004).
21. Melissa Daniels, Richard Simmons Slams ‘Billing Fiesta’ in Defamation
Suit, L AW 360 (Jan. 31, 2018), https://www.law360.com/articles/1007565/richardsimmons-slams-billing-fiesta-in-defamation-suit.
22. Id.
23. See, e.g., Kenzie Bryant, Richard Simmons’s Loss Could be Transgender
Rights’
Gain,
V ANITY
F AIR
(Aug.
31,
2017),
https://www.vanityfair.com/style/2017/08/richard-simmons-transgender-libel-lawsuit
(asserting that “though Simmons will likely lose, it could prove an unlikely legal
victory for transgender-rights advocates”); Michael Hiltzik, By Tossing a Richard
Simmons Libel Case, a Judge Strikes a Blow Against Transgender Discrimination,
L.A. T IMES (Sept. 1, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la-fi-hiltziksimmons-transgender-20170901-story.html (“This week, Judge Gregory Keosian
issued a tentative ruling that could strike a major blow for gender equality before the
law. He found that whether it’s true or not that Simmons underwent the transition
as the Enquirer reported, it’s simply not libelous or defamatory to call someone
transgender.”); Anthony Michael Kreis, Judge: Calling Someone Trans Isn’t
Defamatory Because There’s Nothing Wrong with Being Trans, S LATE (Sept. 15,
2017),http://www.slate.com/blogs/outward/2017/09/15/richard_simmons_loses_
lawsuits_on_transgender_defamation.html (asserting that “transgender Americans
achieved a little-noticed but critical legal victory in a California state court. Judge
Gregory Keosian announced he will dismiss fitness guru Richard Simmons’
defamation lawsuit in which Simmons claimed reputational harm after the National
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recent rulings holding that a false accusation of being gay is not
defamatory per se.24 These opinions contrast with older cases
reaching the opposite conclusion.25
In the process of ruling for the National Enquirer and securing a
supposed win for LGBTQ equality, Judge Keosian also seemingly
gave short shrift to the reputational harm Simmons allegedly
suffered. As Neville Johnson put it, “[t]his is not a victory for
transgender rights, but rather for the ability to publish false
information meant to impugn and ridicule another.”26 In brief, “the
clown prince of fitness”27 was not laughing when his case was
elevated from an individual lawsuit into a larger cultural battle over
LGBTQ rights and when the greater good of societal equality
triumphed over personal need—or, at least, desire—for redress.
Simmons’ co-counsel Rodney Smolla bluntly called Keosian’s
decision an “exercise of idealism” rather than “realism.”28

Enquirer falsely called him a transgender woman”); Nico Lang, ‘Calling Someone
Transgender is Not An Insult’: Landmark Ruling in Richard Simmons Case, INTO
(Aug. 31, 2017), https://www.intomore.com/impact/calling-someone-transgender-isnot-an-insult-landmark-ruling-in-richard-simmons-case/7c95df4baa16412a
(reporting that “advocates say that the ruling is an unusual victory for LGBTQ
rights,” and adding that “Lambda Legal, the national LGBTQ civil rights
organization, applauded the judge’s ruling”).
24. See, e.g., Cornelius-Millan v. Caribbean Univ., Inc., 261 F. Supp. 3d 143,
156 (D.P.R. 2016) (concluding that “falsely accusing someone of being
a homosexual can no longer be considered slander per se”); Stern v. Cosby, 645 F.
Supp. 2d 258, 275 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (holding that statements “are not defamatory per
se merely because they impute homosexuality,” with then-U.S. District Judge Denny
Chin stating prior that “[w]hile I certainly agree that gays and lesbians continue to
face prejudice, I respectfully disagree that the existence of this continued prejudice
leads to the conclusion that there is a widespread view of gays and lesbians as
contemptible and disgraceful”); Albright v. Morton, 321 F. Supp. 2d 130, 138 (D.
Mass. 2004) (acknowledging that while “a segment of the community views
homosexuals as immoral,” the judiciary “should not, directly or indirectly, give effect
to these prejudices. If this Court were to agree that calling someone a homosexual is
defamatory per se—it would, in effect, validate that sentiment and legitimize
relegating homosexuals to second-class status”).
25. See, e.g., Manale v. City of New Orleans Dep’t of Police, 673 F.2d 122, 125
(5th Cir. 1982) (concluding that statements labeling the plaintiff “gay” and a
“fruit” were defamatory per se).
26. Nancy Dillon, Simmons’ ‘Trans Libel’ Suit Nixed, D AILY N EWS (N.Y.),
Sept. 6, 2017, at 3.
27. Kathy Mackay, Former Fatty Richard Simmons is the Grand Duke of
Diet and the Clown Prince of Fitness, P EOPLE (Apr. 13, 1981),
http://people.com/archive/former-fatty-richard-simmons-is-the-grand-duke-ofdiet-and-the-clown-prince-of-fitness-vol-15-no-14/.
28. Nancy Dillon, Sweatin’ it Out: Simmons Lawsuit Against Enquirer in
Trouble, D AILY N EWS (N.Y.), Aug. 31, 2017, at News 16.
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This Article examines the tension laid bare in Simmons between
individual recovery for reputational harm, on the one hand, and the
legal system’s desire not to endorse or validate prejudicial views
against certain classes of individuals, on the other. Phrased as a
research question: when should courts, “acting as guardians of
public morality,”29 hold that certain false accusations are not
defamatory per se even when those accusations are viewed
negatively by “a substantial and respectable minority”30 of the
community? More colloquially and colorfully, when is it okay for a
judge to throw an individual who suffered reputational harm under
the bus31 for the sake of a larger social cause?
To contextualize this issue, Part I analyzes Simmons v.
American Media, Inc., delving beyond the court’s opinion and into
the parties’ pleadings and arguments, including the National
Enquirer’s motion to strike Simmons’ complaint under California’s
anti-SLAPP statute.32 Part II has two sections—the first reviews
how courts typically determine defamatory meaning, while the
second analyzes the evolution of false allegations of homosexuality
and other false allegations that once were defamatory per se but are
not necessarily so today.33 Next, Part III moves beyond the legal
realm to explore data and research regarding current societal
attitudes in the United States toward transgender individuals.34
Finally, this Article concludes by suggesting criteria for courts to
deploy in future cases like Simmons where individual reputational
harm is pitted against the law’s desire to reject rulings that embrace
prejudice.35

29. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 22 (1971).
30. See Laura A. Heymann, The Law of Reputation and the Interest of the
Audience, 52 B.C. L. R EV . 1341, 1377 (2011) (“A statement can have a defamatory
effect even if it resonates only with ‘a substantial and respectable minority,’
assuming that the audience is a creditable one.”).
31. See Word History: Why Do We ‘Throw Someone Under the Bus’? Let’s Blame
the British, M ERRIAM -W EBSTER , https://www.merriam-webster.com/words-atplay/why-do-we-throw-someone-under-the-bus (last visited Oct. 26, 2018) (discussing
the origins and meaning of the phrase “throw someone under the bus”).
32. See infra notes 36–121 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 122–227 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 228–84 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 285–302 and accompanying text.
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I. THE LAWSUIT: A PRIMER ON RICHARD SIMMONS’ CASE AGAINST THE
NATIONAL ENQUIRER
Richard Simmons sued the National Enquirer and its owner,
American Media, Inc., in state court in Los Angeles County,
California in May 2017.36 The suit, which now is on appeal,37
features four causes of action for libel and one count of false light
invasion of privacy.38 It pivots on the June 20, 2016 issue of the
tabloid.39 That issue’s cover claims Simmons had: (1) transitioned
from a man to a woman; (2) undergone castration surgery; and (3)
received a “secret boob job.”40
Inside the issue, an article leads with the claim that “[w]eight
loss expert Richard Simmons has undergone shocking sex swap
surgery to change from a man to a woman—and The National
Enquirer has the eye-popping world exclusive photos to prove it.”41 It
adds, among other tidbits, that Simmons “hid in his nearly $5
million Hollywood Hills mansion for two long years as he slowly
transformed into a female with breast implants, hormone
treatments and medical consultations on castration.”42
36. Complaint at 1, Simmons v. Am. Media, Inc., No. BC660633 (Cal. Super.
Ct.
L.A.
Cty.
May
8,
2017)
[hereinafter
Simmons
Complaint],
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/3705625-Simmons.html. The complaint
also named as a defendant Radar Online, LLC, which—as with the National
Enquirer—is owned by American Media and is the online counterpart to the
National Enquirer.
37. Appellant’s Opening Brief at 1, Simmons v. Am. Media, Inc., Court of
Appeal No. B285988 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 7, 2018).
38. Simmons Complaint, supra note 36, at 1. Under California law, false light
invasion of privacy is considered substantively the same as libel, and a plaintiff
suing for false light, thus, must prove the same requirements as libel. Tamkin v.
CBS Broad., Inc., 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 264, 276 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011). A California
statute, which targets such duplicativeness, makes it clear that:
No person shall have more than one cause of action for damages
for libel or slander or invasion of privacy or any other tort founded
upon any single publication or exhibition or utterance, such as one
issue of a newspaper or book or magazine or any one presentation
to an audience or any one broadcast over radio or television or any
one exhibition of a motion picture. Recovery in any action shall
include all damages for any such tort suffered by the plaintiff in
all jurisdictions.
C AL . C IV . C ODE § 3425.3 (West 2017).
39. Simmons Complaint, supra note 36, at 6, Ex. 1. Although the date on the
issue is June 20, 2016, the issue was actually published earlier on June 8, 2016. Id.
at 6.
40. Id. at 6, Ex. 1.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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Shortly after the article was published, Simmons denounced it as
false, claiming “he was not transitioning from a male to a female.”43
The complaint in Simmons characterizes his public statement as an
“unequivocal denial of the gender transitioning story.”44
In a nutshell, Simmons’ complaint alleges that the article,
headlines, photos, and cover of the June 20, 2016 edition of the
National Enquirer falsely insinuate he “has and continues to
undergo sex-change surgery.”45 The complaint avers that Simmons’
“case is about a particularly egregious and hurtful campaign of
defamations and privacy invasions, falsely asserting that Mr.
Simmons is transitioning from a male to a female, including
‘shocking sex surgery,’ breast implants, hormone treatments, and
consultations on medical castration.”46
In July 2017, the National Enquirer filed a motion to strike the
complaint under California’s anti-SLAPP statute.47 To avoid having
a cause of action dismissed under this provision, a plaintiff—here,
Richard Simmons—must establish “a probability” of prevailing on
the claim.48 This means “a plaintiff must make a prima facie
showing of facts which would, if proved, support a judgment in his or
her favor.”49
A key element, in turn, of establishing a libel claim in California
is proving a statement conveys a defamatory meaning such that it:
(1) exposes the plaintiff to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy; (2)
causes the plaintiff to be shunned or avoided; or (3) injures the
plaintiff in his occupation.50 If, however, a statement is not libelous
per se—if a defamatory meaning is not clear from the face of the
statement and, instead, is recognized only with extrinsic

43. Id. at 7.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 10.
46. Id. at 2.
47. Notice of Motion and Special Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s First Amended
Complaint; Supporting Memorandum of Points and Authorities at 1, Simmons v. Am.
Media Inc., No. BC660633 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. Cty. July 26, 2017) [hereinafter
Motion to Strike].
48. CAL. CIV. PROC. C ODE § 425.16(b)(1) (West 2017). In addition to the
probability-of-prevailing facet, California’s anti-SLAPP statute applies only if the
defendant (the target or victim of the SLAPP) was acting in furtherance of his “right
of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California
Constitution in connection with a public issue.” Id. A discussion of the “public issue”
element is beyond the scope of this Article.
49. Walker v. Kiousis, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 69, 75 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
50. C AL . C IV . C ODE § 45 (West 2017).
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“explanatory matter”51—then a plaintiff must additionally allege and
prove special damages to prevail.52 Special damages, as noted
earlier,53 are those that a “plaintiff alleges and proves that he or she
has suffered in respect to his or her property, business, trade,
profession, or occupation, including the amounts of money the
plaintiff alleges and proves he or she has expended as a result of the
alleged libel, and no other.”54
The National Enquirer’s motion to strike thus pivoted on two key
arguments:
(1) Richard Simmons could not establish a probability of
winning because a false allegation of being transgender is not
libelous per se;55 and
(2) Simmons failed to plead the requisite special damages to
prevail when a statement is not libelous per se.56
It is the first argument that lies at the heart of this Article. The
National Enquirer’s logic here was straightforward, with the
tabloid’s attorneys contending that:
[s]tatements that someone is transgender, or undergoing a
gender transition, do not impute the kind of inherently
shameful or odious characteristic that can support a
defamation claim in modern times. Just as with false
imputations of race or homosexuality, which once were

51. Id. § 45a. As a California appellate court described the difference between
libel per se and libel per quod in the Golden State:
If . . . a reader would perceive a defamatory meaning without
extrinsic aid beyond his or her own intelligence and common
sense, then . . . there is a libel per se. But if the reader would be
able to recognize a defamatory meaning only by virtue of his or her
knowledge of specific facts and circumstances, extrinsic to the
publication, which are not matters of common knowledge
rationally attributable to all reasonable persons, then . . . the libel
cannot be libel per se but will be libel per quod.
Barnes-Hind, Inc. v. Superior Court, 226 Cal. Rptr. 354, 359–60 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986);
see also R OBERT T RAGER ET AL ., T HE L AW OF J OURNALISM AND M ASS
C OMMUNICATION 156 (6th ed. 2018) (“Some kinds of statements convey such
defamatory meaning that they are considered to be defamatory as a matter of law; on
its face and without further proof, the content is defamatory. This is libel per se.”).
52. C AL . C IV . C ODE § 45a (West 2017).
53. Supra note 12 and accompanying text.
54. C AL . C IV . C ODE § 48a(d)(2) (West 2017).
55. Motion to Strike, supra note 47, at 12.
56. Id. at 12–13.
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considered defamatory, being referred to as “transgender”
cannot rationally be held by a court to impute negative
characteristics.57
Unpacking this statement reveals two key points. First, it
stresses that what once was defamatory may not be so today.58
Contemporary context, in other words, is key.59 The National
Enquirer, therefore, argued that “as society’s mores and values
evolve, assertions that might have been offensive to a past
generation may no longer be defamatory.”60 Attorneys for the tabloid
cited four examples of assertions that, although defamatory per se in
the past, are no longer held so today by some courts. These include
false allegations a person: (1) has cancer;61 (2) was born out of
wedlock;62 (3) is black;63 and (4) is homosexual.64
The most recent of these to switch to non-defamatory per se
status,65 at least for some courts—although certainly not all66—is

57. Id. at 12.
58. See C LAY C ALVERT ET AL ., M ASS M EDIA L AW 164 (20th ed. 2018) (“What
is considered defamatory will vary by location and change over time.”).
59. See Motion to Strike, supra note 47, at 20 (“Whether a statement is
defamatory is not evaluated by any static test. Context is critical.”).
60. Id. at 21.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 22.
65. Importantly, a false imputation of homosexuality can still be held
defamatory per quod, even if it is not defamatory per se. Haven Ward, “I’m Not Gay,
M’kay?”: Should Falsely Calling Someone a Homosexual be Defamatory?, 44 G A . L.
R EV . 739, 758–59 (2010) (“No court has ruled that the misidentification of someone
as homosexual is not defamatory as a matter of law. Although all courts have found
such statements defamatory, the courts are divided as to whether they constitute
defamation per se or per quod.”).
66. In 2008, a federal district court in New York concluded that imputations of
homosexuality are slanderous per se. Gallo v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane-Societa
Per Azioni, 585 F. Supp. 2d 520, 550 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). United States District Judge
Colleen McMahon largely based her decision in Gallo “on the fact that the
prejudice gays and lesbians experience is real and sufficiently widespread so that it
would be premature to declare victory. If the degree of this widespread prejudice
disappears, this Court welcomes the red flag that will attach to this decision.” Id. at
549–50.
Two years later, a federal district court in Texas reasoned that “judicial
caution requires the Court to acknowledge that the imputation of homosexuality
might as a matter of fact expose a person to public hatred, contempt or ridicule.”
Robinson v. Radio One, Inc., 695 F. Supp. 2d 425, 428 (N.D. Tex. 2010). In doing so,
Judge Reed O’Connor allowed the plaintiff to proceed with discovery and called the
question of whether falsely labeling someone gay is defamatory per se “ripe for the
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homosexuality.67 Professor Jay Barth observes that “[h]istorically,
American courts have generally found that falsely identifying
someone as gay, lesbian, or bisexual (LGB) was defamation per se.”68
The U.S. Supreme Court’s 2003 decision in Lawrence v. Texas,69
however, propelled a shift away from this position.70
In Lawrence, the Court declared an anti-sodomy statute
unconstitutional, thereby decriminalizing gay sexual practices.71
This proved pivotal for libel law. Prior to Lawrence, “the large
majority of the courts that [had] found an accusation of
homosexuality to be defamatory per se emphasized the fact that
such a statement imputed criminal conduct.”72 This logic, in turn,
hinged on the fact that “[f]alse statements imputing criminal activity
are among the categories of speech that are presumed to
be defamatory per se.”73 Lawrence rendered nugatory this criminalactivity rationale for declaring false accusations of homosexuality to
be defamatory per se.74
Critically for purposes of Simmons, however, California’s
statutory definition of libel per se does not delineate it by specific
categories of content such as imputations of criminal conduct.75
clarification that comes from allowing litigation to proceed rather than the
imposition of a single judge’s view.” Id. at 428 n.4.
67. In contrast to the homosexuality line of defamation cases, racial
misidentification claims largely disappeared in the 1950s. See Lyrissa Barnett
Lidsky, Defamation, Reputation, and the Myth of Community, 71 W ASH . L. R EV . 1,
30 (1996) (“Although a great many cases where plaintiffs sued over a false statement
that they were African-American appeared in the reporters prior to 1950, after that
date they began to disappear.”).
68. Jay Barth, Is False Imputation of Being Gay, Lesbian, or Bisexual Still
Defamatory? The Arkansas Case, 34 U. A RK . L ITTLE R OCK L. R EV . 527, 527 (2012).
69. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
70. See Cornelius-Millan v. Caribbean Univ., Inc., 261 F. Supp. 3d 143, 155–56
(D.P.R. 2016) (noting that in light of Lawrence, “recent case law holds that falsely
accusing a person of being a homosexual is not slander per se” and concluding that
“falsely accusing someone of being a homosexual can no longer be considered slander
per se”); Stern v. Cosby, 645 F. Supp. 2d 258, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (finding that “to
the extent that courts previously relied on the criminality of homosexual conduct in
holding that a statement imputing homosexuality subjects a person to contempt and
ridicule . . . Lawrence has foreclosed such reliance”).
71. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. The Texas statute at issue in Lawrence
criminalized anal sex between members of the same sex, classifying it as deviant
sexual intercourse. Id. at 562–63.
72. Albright v. Morton, 321 F. Supp. 2d 130, 137 (D. Mass. 2004).
73. Holly Miller, Homosexuality as Defamation: A Proposal for the Use of the
“Right-Thinking Minds” Approach in the Development of Modern Jurisprudence, 18
C OMM . L. & P OL ’ Y 349, 356 (2013).
74. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
75. See C AL . C IV . C ODE § 45a (West 2017).

2018]

DEFAMATION PER SE AND TRANSGENDER STATUS 1041

Rather, a statement is libelous on its face if its defamatory meaning
exists “without the necessity of explanatory matter, such as an
inducement, innuendo or other extrinsic fact.”76 In other words, in
California, “libel . . . is per se when defamatory on its face.”77
This constitutes “an expansive view in interpreting the viability
of a claim for libel per se,”78 and California courts, in turn, “have
used the libel statute to broaden the scope of per se liability.”79 As
Professor Robert Richards notes, “California has expanded the reach
of defamation per se in other circumstances,”80 stretching beyond
“the traditional ground of imputation of criminal behavior.”81
It is only California’s definition of slander (the spoken form of
defamation)82 that articulates a cause of action in terms of a
statement that “[c]harges any person with crime, or with having
been indicted, convicted, or punished for crime.”83 All of this
significantly mitigates, if not eliminates, the impact of Lawrence’s
decriminalization of certain homosexual practices on the libel per se
issue in California.
The second and related key point is the National Enquirer’s
effort to analogize recent judicial acceptance of homosexuality as a
non-defamatory per se state of sexual orientation to transgenderism
as a state of gender identity. In other words, one might ask: if it is
not defamatory per se today to falsely say someone is gay, then why
should it not also be non-defamatory per se to falsely say someone is
transgender? As the National Enquirer contended, “Simmons’
assertion that it is libelous to state a person is transitioning genders
rests entirely on the same kind of outdated prejudices about
transgender individuals that have been widely rejected in analogous
circumstances.”84

76. Id.
77. Regalia v. Nethercutt Collection, 90 Cal. Rptr. 3d 882, 887 (Cal. Ct. App.
2009).
78. Andrew Bossory, Defamation Per Se: Be Prepared to Plead (and Prove!)
Actual
Damages,
AM.
B.
A SS ’ N
(June
3,
2014),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/business-torts-unfaircompetition/articles/2014/defamation-prepared-plead/.
79. Id.
80. Richards, supra note 10, at 361.
81. Id.
82. See Leslie Yalof Garfield, The Death of Slander, 35 C OLUM . J.L. & A RTS
17, 19 (2011) (defining slander as “spoken defamation” and libel as “written
defamation”).
83. C AL . C IV . C ODE § 46 (West 2017).
84. Motion to Strike, supra note 47, at 23.
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A glaring threshold problem with this logic, however, is that
sexual orientation and gender identity simply are not the same
thing.85 Sexual orientation, according to the Human Rights
Campaign,86 is “[a]n inherent or immutable enduring emotional,
romantic or sexual attraction to other people.”87 Gender identity, in
contrast, “is the personal psychological experience of one’s own
gender”88 or, more simply, “a person’s internal sense of being male,
female or something else.”89 In brief, “sexual orientation is about
who you are attracted to and fall in love with; gender identity is
about who you are.”90 This means that homosexuality and
transgenderism are distinct—a fact that the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit recently acknowledged.91 The difference
between sexual orientation and gender identity and, in turn, the
distinction between homosexuality and transgenderism inevitably
clouds and convolutes the National Enquirer’s effort to analogize
them.
The second problem with this reasoning is that although
prejudices may be “outdated,” it does not mean that they do not exist
and that transgender individuals do not suffer precisely the type of
negative consequences for which libel law is intended to compensate.
In other words, outdated prejudices—politically incorrect views, in
the parlance of our times—still: (1) expose transgender individuals

85. The American Psychological Association explains that “[g]ender identity
and sexual orientation are not the same. Sexual orientation refers to an individual’s
enduring physical, romantic, and/or emotional attraction to another person, whereas
gender identity refers to one’s internal sense of being male, female, or something
else.” A M . P SYCHOL . A SS ’ N , ANSWERS TO YOUR QUESTIONS ABOUT TRANSGENDER
PEOPLE,
GENDER
IDENTITY,
AND
GENDER
EXPRESSION
2
(2014),
http://www.apa.org/topics/lgbt/transgender.pdf.
86. The Human Rights Campaign is “the largest civil rights organization
working to achieve equality for lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and queer
Americans.” About Us, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, http://www.hrc.org/hrc-story/about-us
(last visited Oct. 27, 2018).
87. Glossary
of
Terms,
HUM.
RTS.
CAMPAIGN,
http://www.hrc.org/resources/glossary-of-terms (last visited Oct. 27, 2018).
88. David M. Buck, Defining Transgender: What Do Lay Definitions Say About
Prejudice?, 3 P SYCHOL . S EXUAL O RIENTATION & G ENDER D IVERSITY 465, 465
(2016).
89. A M . P SYCHOL . A SS ’ N , ANSWERS TO YOUR QUESTIONS ABOUT
TRANSGENDER PEOPLE, GENDER IDENTITY, AND GENDER EXPRESSION 1 (2014),
http://www.apa.org/topics/lgbt/transgender.pdf.
90. Transgender FAQ, GLAAD, https://www.glaad.org/transgender/transfaq
(last visited Oct. 27, 2018).
91. Avendano-Hernandez v. Lynch, 800 F.3d 1072, 1081 (9th Cir. 2015) (“While
the relationship between gender identity and sexual orientation is complex, and
sometimes overlapping, the two identities are distinct.”).
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to hatred, ridicule, and contempt; (2) cause them to be shunned and
avoided; and (3) detrimentally affect them in their jobs.92 As
Simmons’ attorney Rodney Smolla put it, the ruling against his
client was an “exercise of idealism” rather than “realism.”93
Beyond the National Enquirer’s dual foundational arguments—
that what is defamatory changes over time, and that shifts in how
courts treat false allegations of homosexuality are analogous to how
they should treat assertions of being transgender—the tabloid made
a broader argument. As the motion to strike put it:
The legal rule Simmons proposes—that gender transition is
somehow shameful or odious— . . . would be contrary to
California law and public policy, which recognize the dignity
of transgender individuals and their right to equal treatment.
California prohibits discrimination against transgender
people, including in housing, employment, public
accommodations, health insurance and school activities.
California also was the first state to ban the “trans panic”
defense in homicide cases.94
The problem with this logic, of course, is that the legal right to
equal treatment does not mean that, in the reality of their day-today lives, transgender people are treated equally. In other words,
California laws might bar discrimination against transgender
individuals, but statutory symbolism does not mirror the real-world
treatment of and attitudes toward transgender Californians. Part III
of this Article, in fact, provides data and scholarly research revealing
the discrimination that transgender people experience daily.95
To address this apparent weakness in its argument, the National
Enquirer averred that while “there are still people who are biased
against gay people,”96 it violates public policy for courts to recognize
such prejudice via a defamatory per se classification. As the motion
to strike contended, “[t]ransgender individuals may still face

92. See C AL . C IV . C ODE § 45 (West 2017) (defining libel, in key part, as a
publication that “exposes any person to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or
which causes him to be shunned or avoided, or which has a tendency to injure him in
his occupation”).
93. Dillon, supra note 28, at News 16.
94. Motion to Strike, supra note 47, at 23 (emphasis added).
95. See infra notes 228–84 .
96. Motion to Strike, supra note 47, at 22.

1044

TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85.1029

prejudice, but that does not justify finding, as a legal matter, that
they are contemptible or disgraceful.”97
In September 2017, Judge Keosian granted the National
Enquirer’s motion to strike.98 Critical to this decision was Keosian’s
analysis of the question, as he framed it, of whether “falsely
reporting that a person is transgender [has] a natural tendency to
injure one’s reputation.”99 The “natural tendency” language reflects
how California courts have interpreted the state’s libel per se
statute100 for deciding if a statement, in fact, is libelous per se.101
That statute provides that “[a] libel which is defamatory of the
plaintiff without the necessity of explanatory matter, such as an
inducement, innuendo or other extrinsic fact, is said to be a libel on
its face.”102 Keosian concluded here that:
because courts have long held that a misidentification of
certain immutable characteristics do not naturally tend to
injure one’s reputation, even if there is a sizeable portion of
the population who hold prejudices against those
characteristics, misidentification of a person as transgender
is not actionable defamation absent special damages.103
The “immutable characteristics”104 line of cases Keosian cited
supporting this proposition included decisions addressing medical
conditions, racial misidentification, and homosexuality.105 Focusing
on false allegations of homosexuality, the judge noted that while
“there is no connection between homosexuality and being
transgender, both characteristics relate to sex and gender.”106 In
brief, he cursorily dismissed the vital differences between sexual
orientation (homosexuality) and gender identity (transgenderism)

97. Id. at 24.
98. Simmons Order, supra note 5, at 1.
99. Id. at 6.
100. C AL . C IV . C ODE § 45a (West 2017).
101. See MacLeod v. Tribune Publ’g Co., 343 P.2d 36, 41 (Cal. 1959) (“The Code
definition of libel is very broad and has been held to include almost any language
which, upon its face, has a natural tendency to injure a person’s reputation, either
generally, or with respect to his occupation.”) (emphasis added) (quoting Bates v.
Campbell, 2 P.2d 383, 385 (Cal. 1931)).
102. C AL . C IV . C ODE § 45a (West 2017).
103. Simmons Order, supra note 5, at 6.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 7–8.
106. Id. at 8.

2018]

DEFAMATION PER SE AND TRANSGENDER STATUS 1045

described earlier,107 perhaps for purposes of judicial expediency or
for smoothing the path to reach his ultimate conclusion against
Simmons.
Although acknowledging that transgender individuals “may be
held in contempt by a portion of the population,”108 Keosian decided
“not [to] validate those prejudices by legally recognizing them.”109
Keosian threw a sop to the discrimination faced by transgender
individuals, noting he reviewed “the deplorable statistics relating
to”110 them and contending his ruling did not imply “that the
difficulties and bigotry facing transgender individuals is minimal or
nonexistent.”111 What was paramount for Keosian, however, was not
giving legal force and effect to prejudices against transgender
individuals, regardless of whether “there is a sizeable portion of the
population who view being transgender as negative.”112
Thus, in a nifty bit of judicial jiu-jitsu, Keosian readily
acknowledged substantial prejudice against transgender individuals
yet simultaneously concluded “that being misidentified as
transgender is not libelous per se because such identification does
not expose ‘any person to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or
which causes him to be to be shunned or avoided, or which has a
tendency to injure him in his occupation.’”113 He worked his way
around such apparent cognitive dissonance114 by focusing on the
negative public policy ramifications of libel law recognizing a false
accusation of being transgender as defamatory per se.115
Viewed harshly and cynically, Judge Keosian ripped libel law
from its venerable moorings as a dignitary tort116 designed to
provide individual redress for reputational harm.117 He transformed

107. See supra notes 85–91 and accompanying text.
108. Simmons Order, supra note 5, at 9.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 11.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 9 (quoting C AL . C IV . C ODE § 45 (West 2017)).
114. See Leon Festinger, Cognitive Dissonance, 207 S CI . A M . 93, 93 (1962)
(stating cognitive dissonance theory “centers around the idea that if a person knows
various things that are not psychologically consistent with one another, he will, in a
variety of ways, try to make them more consistent”).
115. Simmons Order, supra note 5, at 9.
116. See David S. Ardia, Freedom of Speech, Defamation, and Injunctions, 55
W M . & M ARY L. R EV . 1, 9 (2013) (“Defamation, which encompasses both libel and
slander, is a dignitary tort directed at remedying harm to a plaintiff's reputation
caused by false statements of fact.”)
117. See T RAGER , supra note 51, at 145 (“Libel law is meant to protect an
individual’s reputation. It allows a person who believes his or her reputation has
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it into a vehicle for judges to render feel-good, symbolic rulings that
ostensibly promote equality and condemn prejudice. One might
wonder, in turn, whether this is a task better left to a legislative
body than to a lone judge hearing an individual tort case.
Under Keosian’s view in Simmons, a plaintiff suing for libel per
se under California Civil Code § 45a118 must do more than simply
prove that a message conveys a defamatory meaning “without the
necessity of explanatory matter, such as an inducement, innuendo or
other extrinsic fact.”119 Furthermore, he must do more than just
prove that, in Keosian’s words, “a sizeable portion of the
population”120 views the meaning in a defamatory light. Keosian
adds a third burden on top of these two hurdles—namely, a plaintiff
must demonstrate that judicial recognition of this meaning as
redressable does not convey or send a message of inferiority to a
class or group of individuals.121
The next Part of this Article explores in greater detail the typical
standards in American libel law for measuring and evaluating
defamatory meaning. It also goes into more depth on the shifting of
views about homosexuality in libel law—the closest, albeit flawed,
analog for transgender status—by reviewing judicial opinions and
the works of other legal scholars who have examined this evolution.
II. NORMATIVE JUDGMENTS ABOUT DEFAMATORY MEANING: THE
HEART OF DEFAMATION LAW
This Part has two sections. Section A reviews the standards that
courts commonly invoke to determine if a message conveys a
defamatory meaning. Section B then returns to the question of
whether falsely calling someone homosexual conveys a defamatory
meaning, examining both case law and legal scholarship on this
topic. That question merits further consideration here because,
although not the same, it both approximates and sheds light on the
issue of whether falsely labeling someone transgender is defamatory
per se.

been injured to file a claim against the party responsible, asking for monetary
damages to compensate for harm and to restore his or her reputation.”).
118. See Barnes-Hind, Inc. v. Superior Court, 226 Cal. Rptr. 354, 356 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1986) (“Libel per se is distinguished from libel per quod in Civil Code section
45a.”).
119. C AL . C IV . C ODE § 45a (West 2017).
120. Simmons Order, supra note 5, at 6.
121. Simmons Order, supra note 5, at 9.

2018]

DEFAMATION PER SE AND TRANSGENDER STATUS 1047

A. Determining Defamatory Meaning
Lyrissa Lidsky, dean of the University of Missouri School of Law,
observed more than two decades ago that “[t]he threshold inquiry in
every defamation action is whether the statement at issue is capable
of a defamatory meaning.”122 As Lidsky noted, a “judge must
determine whether the words used are ‘defamatory,’ that is, whether
they are the type of words that have the tendency to harm
reputation.”123 This, in turn, requires a court to make “both a
linguistic inquiry to discover the ‘tendencies’ of words and a
sociological inquiry to discover the attitudes and beliefs of the
community, for what is defamatory is a function of defamation law’s
unique conception of reputational harm.”124
In whose eyes, then, must a person’s reputation be sullied?
United States Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.
opined more than one century ago that a statement must “hurt the
plaintiff in the estimation of an important and respectable part of
the community.”125 Similarly, the Restatement (Second) of Torts
holds that a message conveys a defamatory meaning if it harms an
individual’s reputation in the eyes of “a substantial and respectable
minority” of the community.126
Neither Holmes nor the Restatement, therefore, mandates that
the statement must hurt a person’s reputation in the eyes of a
majority of the community. As Holmes put it, “liability is not a
question of a majority vote.”127 Ultimately, as Rodney Smolla
observes, Holmes’ approach in Peck “became the prevailing
American view.”128 Some courts have slightly tweaked the standard
by substituting “considerable and respectable”129 for “important and
respectable.”130
New York applies a right-thinking person approach for
evaluating defamatory meaning. As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the

122. Lidsky, supra note 67, at 11 (citing Romaine v. Kallinger, 537 A.2d 284
(N.J. 1988)).
123. Id. (citing MARE A. FRANKLIN & DAVID A. ANDERSON, MASS MEDIA LAW
196, 201, 203 (5th ed. 1995)).
124. Id.
125. Peck v. Tribune Co., 214 U.S. 185, 190 (1909).
126. R ESTATEMENT (S ECOND ) OF T ORTS § 559 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
127. Peck, 214 U.S. at 190 (emphasis added).
128. R ODNEY A. S MOLLA , L AW OF D EFAMATION § 4:4 (2d ed., 2008).
129. Stanton v. Metro Corp., 438 F.3d 119, 125 (1st Cir. 2006). In Stanton, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit applied Massachusetts’ defamation law.
Id. at 124–25.
130. Peck, 214 U.S. at 190.
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Second Circuit recently wrote in Elias v. Rolling Stone,131 the
question in the Empire State is whether a statement would “expose
the plaintiff to public contempt, ridicule, aversion or disgrace, or
induce an evil opinion of him in the minds of right-thinking
persons.”132 Kentucky also applies a right-thinking person
standard.133
In California, the venue for Simmons, the state’s Supreme Court
held that what matters is “the impact of communications between
ordinary human beings”134 and “the natural and probable effect upon
the mind of the average reader.”135 But as Judge Robert Sack points
out in his treatise on libel, the nature of the audience for whom a
message is intended affects who constitutes the average reader.136
He contends that “[c]ommunications are thus judged on the basis of
the impact that they will probably have on those who are likely to
receive them.”137
In Simmons, that means average readers of the National
Enquirer. Therefore, one would need to determine if an
important/substantial and respectable minority of average readers of
the National Enquirer would consider falsely labeling someone
transgender to be defamatory. According to the tabloid’s 2018 media
kit, the median age and household income of a National Enquirer
reader are 52.3 years and $60,942,138 and 62% of readers are
female.139

131. 872 F.3d 97 (2d Cir. 2017).
132. Id. at 104 (quoting Stepanov v. Dow Jones & Co., 120 A.D.3d 28, 34 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2014)).
133. CMI, Inc. v. Intoximeters, Inc., 918 F. Supp. 1068, 1083 (W.D. Ky. 1995).
134. MacLeod v. Tribune Publ’g Co., 343 P.2d 36, 44 (Cal. 1959).
135. Id. at 41–42.
136. S ACK , supra note 10, § 2:4.3.
137. Id.
138. According to a September 2017 report by the U.S. Census Bureau, the
$60,942 figure is just slightly above the country’s median household income figure of
$59,039 from 2016. JESSICA L. SEMEGA ET AL., INCOME AND POVERTY IN THE UNITED
STATES:
2016,
U.S.
CENSUS
BUREAU
5
(2017),
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2017/demo/P60259.pdf.
139. National Enquirer 2018 Media Kit, NAT’L ENQUIRER (2017),
https://www.americanmediainc.com/sites/americanmediainc.com/files/2018_NEQ_M
EDIA_KIT_r.pdf.
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B. False Imputations of Homosexuality: Analyzing Recent
Judicial Rulings and Legal Scholarship
As addressed in Part I, the National Enquirer and Judge
Keosian both relied on shifting judicial winds regarding whether a
false accusation of homosexuality is defamatory per se. This section
initially examines three cases in which courts determined that this
label is no longer defamatory per se. It then analyzes legal
scholarship that both praises and criticizes such rulings.
1. The Cases
This subsection surveys a trio of cases in which courts held that
falsely labeling someone homosexual was not defamatory per se:
Albright v. Morton,140 Stern v. Cosby,141 and Cornelius-Millan v.
Caribbean University, Inc.142 These decisions were chosen for
analysis because they not only come from different jurisdictions but
also because they cut across a significant swath of time, spanning
from 2004 through 2016. Exploring these opinions, from oldest to
most recent, illuminates the judges’ reasons for abandoning
precedent and casting aside the principle of stare decisis143 in a postLawrence world.

140. 321 F. Supp. 2d 130 (D. Mass. 2004), aff’d, Amrak Prods., Inc. v. Morton,
410 F.3d 69 (1st Cir. 2005).
141. 645 F. Supp. 2d 258 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
142. 261 F. Supp. 3d 143 (D.P.R. 2016).
143. See Richard M. Garner, Flexible Predictability: Stare Decisis in Ohio, 48
A KRON L. R EV . 15, 15 (2015) (observing that the doctrine of stare decisis “holds that
similar cases should be decided by similar legal principles rather than by the
personal views of an ever-changing judiciary”); Randy J. Kozel, Stare Decisis in the
Second-Best World, 103 C ALIF . L. R EV . 1139, 1143 (2015) (noting that “essence
of stare decisis is a preference for keeping faith with the past”); Larry J. Pittman,
The Federal Arbitration Act: The Supreme Court’s Erroneous Statutory
Interpretation, Stare Decisis, and a Proposal for Change, 53 A LA . L. R EV . 789, 811
(2002) (noting that “for opinions involving statutory interpretation, the Court
employs a presumption against the overruling of precedent, as an essential feature of
its stare decisis doctrine”).
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a. Albright v. Morton
Albright, decided in 2004, arose under Massachusetts law.144 It
centered on a claim by James Albright, a former bodyguard and love
interest of pop icon Madonna, that the book Madonna was
defamatory per se because Albright’s name was mistakenly used to
identify another person—an openly gay man—in a photograph.145
In Massachusetts, “whether a communication is reasonably
susceptible of a defamatory meaning is a question of law for the
court.”146 United States District Judge Nancy Gertner, exercising
this power, bluntly rejected Albright’s theory.147 She concluded—just
one year after the U.S. Supreme Court in Lawrence v. Texas148
struck down an anti-sodomy statute—that “[i]n 2004, a statement
implying that an individual is a homosexual is hardly capable of a
defamatory meaning.”149
Lawrence proved crucial to Gertner’s conclusion. Under
Massachusetts law, “the imputation of a crime is defamatory per
se, requiring no proof of special damages.”150 Indeed, Gertner noted
that “the large majority of the courts that have found an accusation
of homosexuality to be defamatory per se emphasized the fact that
such a statement imputed criminal conduct.”151 Lawrence, she found,
“extinguished” this rationale.152
In addition to relying on Lawrence, Gertner turned to a broader
public policy rationale in ruling against Albright—namely, that
judicial recognition of homosexuality as a defamatory per se
allegation would be tantamount to “relegating homosexuals to
second-class status.”153 Thus, while readily acknowledging “that a
segment of the community views homosexuals as immoral,”154 she
reasoned “that courts should not, directly or indirectly, give effect to
these prejudices.”155 To further elucidate this point, Gertner framed

144. See Albright v. Morton, 321 F. Supp. 2d 130, 134–35 (D. Mass 2004)
(setting forth the general principles of Massachusetts defamation law applicable in
the case).
145. Id. at 132.
146. Phelan v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 819 N.E.2d 550, 554 (Mass. 2004).
147. Albright, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 132.
148. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
149. Albright, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 132.
150. Phelan, 819 N.E.2d at 554.
151. Albright, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 137.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 138.
154. Id.
155. Id.
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her decision in a historical context: “[I]f Albright claimed that he was
a white person wrongfully labeled African-American, the statement
would not be defamation per se, even if segments of the community
still held profoundly racist attitudes.”156
Finally, Gertner stressed that “the category ‘defamation per se’
should be reserved for statements linking an individual to the
category of persons ‘deserving of social approbation’ like a ‘thief,
murderer, prostitute, etc.’”157 The notion that homosexuals belong
among those groups, Gertner made clear, “is nothing short of
outrageous.”158 She added that Albright was simply “trading in the
same kinds of stereotypes that recent case law and good sense
disparage.”159
In 2005, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed
the decision.160 The First Circuit, however, simply found that the
miscaptioned photograph did not impute homosexuality to
Albright.161 The appellate court, thus, did “not decide whether such
an imputation constitutes defamation per se in Massachusetts.”162
b. Stern v. Cosby
Stern, which was decided in 2009, arose under New York
defamation law.163 It pivoted on attorney Howard K. Stern’s claim
that Rita Cosby’s “explosive tell-all book,”164 Blonde Ambition: The
Untold Story Behind Anna Nicole Smith’s Death, falsely imputed he
was gay and that this allegation was defamatory per se.165
Specifically, the book alleged that: (1) Stern and Larry Birkhead, the
father of the child of Stern’s late wife Anna Nicole Smith,166 had oral

156. Id.
157. Id. at 139 (quoting Hayes v. Smith, 832 P.2d 1022, 1025 (Colo. App. 1991)).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Amrak Prods., Inc. v. Morton, 410 F.3d 69, 71 (1st Cir. 2005).
161. Id. at 73.
162. Id.
163. See Stern v. Cosby, 645 F. Supp. 2d 258, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“I begin by
discussing the legal standard applicable to a defamation claim under New
York law.”).
164. Christina Boyle, Anna Guys in Book Bombshell, D AILY N EWS (N.Y.), Sept.
2, 2007, at 2.
165. Stern, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 263.
166. Smith, a former Playboy magazine centerfold who later went on to star in a
reality television show and become a spokesperson for TrimSpa supplements, died at
thirty-nine years of age in Florida in early 2007. Abby Goodnough & Margalit Fox,
Anna Nicole Smith is Found Dead at a Florida Hotel, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2007, at
A12.
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sex at a party; (2) Smith regularly watched a video of Stern and
Birkhead having sex; and (3) Smith called Stern gay.167 United
States District Judge Denny Chin ultimately found the statements
were “not defamatory per se merely because they impute
homosexuality to Stern.”168
Whether a statement is defamatory per se in New York is a
question of law for a judge to decide.169 New York’s highest appellate
court holds that a statement is defamatory per se, such that proof of
special damages is unnecessary, “if it tends to expose a person to
hatred, contempt or aversion, or to induce an evil or unsavory
opinion of him in the minds of a substantial number of the
community, even though it may impute no moral turpitude to
him.”170 This determination “depends, among other factors, upon the
temper of the times, the current of contemporary public opinion,
with the result that words, harmless in one age, in one community,
may be highly damaging to reputation at another time or in a
different place.”171 As Chin aptly noted in Stern, “whether a
statement is defamatory per se can evolve from one generation to the
next.”172
Chin largely based his opinion on the principle that what is
defamatory per se is transitory. He asserted that “[t]he past few
decades have seen a veritable sea change in social attitudes about
homosexuality.”173 Chin pointed to the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2003
decision in Lawrence v. Texas174 that overturned an anti-sodomy
law—the same type of statute courts previously relied on to find
false allegations of homosexuality were defamatory due to an
association with criminal behavior.175 Furthermore, Chin cited a
then-recent poll indicating that a majority of New Yorkers supported
gay marriage as evidence they also would not regard allegations of
homosexuality as something that would expose a person to
“contempt, ridicule, aversion or disgrace.”176

167. Stern, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 267.
168. Id. at 275.
169. Geraci v. Probst, 938 N.E.2d 917, 922 (N.Y. 2010).
170. Mencher v. Chesley, 75 N.E.2d 257, 259 (N.Y. 1947) (citing Katapodis v.
Brooklyn Spectator, Inc., 38 N.E.2d 112, 113 (N.Y. 1941)).
171. Id.
172. Stern, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 273.
173. Id.
174. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
175. Stern, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 273–74.
176. Id. at 274.
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This ruling contravened another decision from the same federal
district in New York just one year prior.177 In that case, Judge
Colleen McMahon largely attributed her decision to widespread
homophobia and prejudice gays and lesbians continued to face.178
Addressing his deviation, Chin explained:
I respectfully disagree that the existence of this continued
prejudice leads to the conclusion that there is a widespread
view of gays and lesbians as contemptible and disgraceful.
Moreover, the fact of such prejudice on the part of some does
not warrant a judicial holding that gays and lesbians, merely
because of their sexual orientation, belong in the same class
as criminals.179
Ultimately, while Chin held that false allegations of
homosexuality are not defamatory per se, he allowed Stern to
proceed on other claims.180 The case settled in November 2009 for an
undisclosed sum of money.181
c. Cornelius-Millan v. Caribbean University, Inc.
Cornelius-Millan, which was decided in 2016, applied Puerto
Rican defamation law.182 The case centered on whether it was
slanderous per se for a professor to call his student “homosexual.”183
Although U.S. Magistrate Judge Bruce McGiverin dismissed the
defamation cause of action on other grounds,184 he held that “falsely
accusing someone of being a homosexual can no longer be considered
slander per se.”185

177. Gallo v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane-Societa Per Azioni, 585 F. Supp. 2d
520, 549–50 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
178. Id.
179. Stern, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 275 (citing Albright v. Morton, 321 F. Supp. 2d
130, 138 (D. Mass. 2004)).
180. Id.
181. Bruce Golding, Anna Lawyer Settles Gay Suit, N.Y. P OST , Nov. 21, 2009, at
7.
182. See Cornelius-Millan v. Caribbean Univ., Inc., 261 F. Supp. 3d 143, 154
(D.P.R. 2016) (reviewing key principles and sources of defamation law in Puerto
Rico).
183. Id. at 155–56.
184. See id. at 154–55 (noting that case law has established that face-to-face
altercations involving name-calling and epithets are not considered defamatory).
185. Id. at 156.
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As with the judges in Albright and Stern described above,
McGiverin relied heavily on the Supreme Court’s Lawrence v.
Texas186 decision in reaching this conclusion.187 In doing so,
McGiverin cited favorably for support the rulings in both Albright
and Stern.188 Specifically, he cited those cases to buttress twin
propositions—namely, that:
• “Lawrence has extinguished the rationale underlying
cases”189 that previously held it defamatory per se to label
someone homosexual because it imputed criminal conduct;
and
• “[R]ecent case law holds that falsely accusing a person
of being a homosexual is not slander per se.”190
In brief, there was a growing body of decisions by 2016 such as
Albright and Stern on which McGiverin could rely to make his ruling
slightly easier and less controversial than those that came before it
on the same question. With these three cases in mind, the next
subsection examines legal scholarship addressing the nexus between
defamation per se and false allegations of homosexuality.
2. The Scholarship
The cases above illustrate that the judicial tide is turning
against branding false imputations of homosexuality defamatory per
se.191 Some scholars laud this change for embracing societal and
legal advances and removing what amounted to court-sanctioned
discrimination.192 Other experts, however, criticize these opinions for
allegedly ignoring lingering problems that gays and lesbians face
today.193

186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

539 U.S. 558 (2003).
Cornelius-Millan, 261 F. Supp. 3d at 155–56.
Id.
Id. at 155 (citing Stern v. Cosby, 645 F. Supp. 2d 258, 275 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)).
Id.
See supra Part II.B.1.
See infra Part II.B.2.a.
See infra Part II.B.2.b.
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a. Praise for Eliminating Defamatory Per Se Status for False
Assertions of Homosexuality
Professor Matthew Bunker observes in a 2011 article that courts
increasingly are “taking judicial notice of changing social attitudes
toward alternative sexualities.”194 And just as the judiciary evolved
in racial misidentification cases, Bunker argues that “public policy
should not permit the law to symbolically endorse discriminatory
attitudes or conduct, even if such attitudes are common.”195 Why?
Because “[t]he imprimatur of the law is a powerful symbolic force
that normalizes certain social understandings,”196 and “[b]asing legal
decisions on discriminatory beliefs and behaviors, whether in libel
law or child custody cases, validates those beliefs and behaviors.”197
Bunker, therefore, offers a bright-line proposal. Specifically, he
posits that unlike false imputations regarding “voluntary
misconduct or malfeasance,”198 those targeting an immutable
characteristic—race, sexual preference, illness, or disability, for
example—or an involuntary status must never carry a defamatory
meaning.199 He insists that courts adopt this standard “regardless of
a judge’s or a jury’s sense of how the Restatement’s ‘substantial and
respectable’ group of so-called right-thinking citizens would view a
statement.”200 In a nutshell, Bunker avers that defamatory injuries
based on immutable traits must cede to equality interests in order to
prevent a judicial stamp of approval on social stigma and
discrimination.201
This tack is necessary, Bunker contends, because even though
the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2003 ruling in Lawrence v. Texas202
eliminated the “criminal foundation”203 for holding false allegations
of homosexuality defamatory per se, “some post-Lawrence courts

194. Matthew D. Bunker et al., Not That There’s Anything Wrong with That:
Imputations of Homosexuality and the Normative Structure of Defamation Law, 21
F ORDHAM I NTELL . P ROP . M EDIA & E NT . L.J. 581, 601 (2011).
195. Id. at 602.
196. Id. at 608
197. Id.
198. Id. at 603.
199. Id.
200. Id.; see also id. at 609 (“Our proposal suggests that courts decline to
recognize as defamatory statements that stigmatize a class of persons based on some
immutable characteristic or involuntary status.”).
201. Id. at 608.
202. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
203. Bunker, supra note 194, at 590.
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have still applied pre-Lawrence precedent.”204 These courts “continue
to find the false imputation of homosexuality to be defamatory per se
solely on the grounds that it either implies unchastity, or has the
tendency to expose a person to public hatred, contempt or
ridicule.”205
Professors Courtney Joslin and Lawrence Levine hail the rulings
in lower court cases such as Albright206 as consistent with both legal
and social strides made by the lesbian and gay community.207 In a
2014 article, they explain that “in light of both cultural and
constitutional law developments, it is hard to justify a rule that
permits a false imputation of LGBT status to be defamatory.”208 As
with Professor Bunker, they analogize this change to a false
imputation that a white person was black—a statement no longer
defamatory per se.209
Joslin and Levine further call for the American Law Institute
(the publisher of the Restatement (Second) of Torts) to adopt the
approach taken by recent courts:
If and when the [American Law Institute] revisits the tort of
defamation, the ALI should explicitly endorse the emerging
trend in the case law and make clear that, as is true for false
imputations of race, false imputations of homosexuality
should not give rise to a cognizable defamation claim. A
determination that sexual-orientation defamation cannot be
actionable would be a substantial step toward recognizing
the dignity of the LGBT community.210
This recommendation, they believe, would “clarify one of the
most complex and confused areas of American tort law.”211
Pointing to the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Lawrence v.
Texas212 as eliminating the criminal-conduct justification for holding
false imputations of homosexuality to be defamatory per se,213
204. Id.
205. Id. at 591.
206. See supra Part II.B.1.a (discussing Albright v. Morton, 321 F. Supp. 2d 130
(D. Mass. 2004)).
207. Courtney G. Joslin & Lawrence C. Levine, The Restatement of Gay(?),
BROOK. L. REV. 621, 660 (2014).
208. Id. at 659.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 661.
211. Id. at 658.
212. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
213. See Barth, supra note 68, at 538.
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Professor Jay Barth contends “there is no continuing justification for
deeming false imputation of an individual as being gay, lesbian, or
bisexual defamatory even in locales where ‘community standards’
exhibit sharply negative attitudes about LGB individuals.”214 He
adds that “gay defamation cases serve only as state-driven
perpetuation of denigration of sexual minorities in direct conflict
with the trajectory of American law regarding sexual orientation.”215
Similarly, attorney Haven Ward argues that decisions holding
allegations of homosexuality to be defamatory are wrong because
this stance “endorses homophobia and demeans the lives of
homosexuals. Due to our country’s firm commitment to civil rights
and opprobrium of invidious prejudice, judges should hold the false
imputation of homosexuality non-defamatory as a matter of law.”216
In summary, many scholars have advocated for eliminating
defamatory per se status for false allegations of homosexuality. Yet,
as noted below, other scholars—albeit writing more than a halfdecade ago—have cautioned against this change.
b. Arguments Against Removing Defamatory Per Se Status for
False Allegations of Homosexuality
Wary of the judiciary jumping the gun, Professor Robert D.
Richards contended in 2010 that there was still some time to go
before libel law could truly reflect the cultural realities of
contemporary society.217 He cautioned that courts should “avoid
creating legal fictions of society having reached some aspirational
level of tolerance” that is not yet prevalent.218 Richards explained
that “sizable pockets of society still hold gays and lesbians to the
obloquy, ridicule, and contempt that define defamation per se”219 and
that judicial denial of this fact “does not eradicate that prejudice
from reality.”220
Likewise, Professor David Ardia emphasized in a 2010 article
that societal “norms do not change overnight.”221 He noted that
“[w]hen even members of the LGBT community are conflicted over

214. Id. at 548.
215. Id.
216. Ward, supra note 65, at 767.
217. Richards, supra note 10, at 368.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 369.
220. Id.
221. David S. Ardia, Reputation in a Networked World: Revisiting the Social
Foundations of Defamation Law, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 261, 298 (2010).
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which strategy to pursue in their efforts to change social norms,
judges seem especially ill-equipped to make these decisions,
particularly when they are doing so through guise of defamation
law.”222 Despite benevolent intentions by courts, Ardia explains that
“judges are forced to decide whether they should take society as it
exists, warts and all, or as they desire it to be.”223 Indeed, this taps
directly into the dilemma faced by Judge Keosian in Simmons v.
American Media, Inc.
Ultimately, decisions like Lawrence v. Texas224 and Obergefell v.
Hodges225 are clear victories for the rights of gays and lesbians and
signal judicial opprobrium and disdain for holding false allegations
of homosexuality defamatory per se. They do not mean, however,
that transgender individuals no longer face blatant discrimination
and stigmatization.
As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit cogently
observed in 2015, “laws recognizing same-sex marriage may do little
to protect a transgender woman . . . from discrimination, police
harassment, and violent attacks in daily life.”226 The Ninth Circuit
added that “significant evidence suggests that transgender persons
are often especially visible, and vulnerable, to harassment and
persecution due to their often public nonconformance with normative
gender roles.”227
The next Part of this Article moves beyond the legal realm to
analyze data and other evidence about societal attitudes and actions
toward transgender individuals. It is essential to review this
material because it may indicate that falsely labeling someone
transgender still harms that person’s reputation today in the eyes of
a considerable and respectable segment of the American population.

222.
223.
224.
225.

Id. at 300.
Id. at 300–01.
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). In Obergefell, the Court concluded that:
same-sex couples may exercise the fundamental right to
marry in all States. It follows that the Court also must
hold—and it now does hold—that there is no lawful basis for
a State to refuse to recognize a lawful samesex marriage performed in another State on the ground of its
same-sex character.
Id. at 2607–08.
226. Avendano-Hernandez v. Lynch, 800 F.3d 1072, 1080 (9th Cir. 2015).
227. Id. at 1081.
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III. TRANSGENDER AND PUBLIC SENTIMENT: SEARCHING FOR SHIFTING
ATTITUDES AND ACTIONS OF ACCEPTANCE
In holding that it was no longer defamatory per se to falsely call
a person homosexual in 2012, a New York appellate court
emphasized what it called “the tremendous evolution in social
attitudes regarding homosexuality.”228 Similarly, in ruling against
Howard K. Stern in Stern v. Cosby,229 U.S. District Judge Denny
Chin cited “a veritable sea change in social attitudes about
homosexuality.”230 Has there been, however, a similar “tremendous
evolution” and “veritable sea change” in societal attitudes today
toward transgender individuals—an evolution sufficient enough to
jettison false allegations of transgender status from the domain of
defamatory per se statements?
A fitting starting point for examining this query and, in turn,
modern attitudes and actions toward231 transgender individuals is
definitional: What exactly does transgender mean?
A 2017 article in the Journal of Endocrinological Investigation
provides that “transgenderism is an umbrella term describing
individuals whose gender identity, expression, or behavior can differ
from those typically associated with their assigned gender.”232
228. Yonaty v. Mincolla, 945 N.Y.S.2d 774, 778 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012) (emphasis
added).
229. See supra Part II.B.1.a (discussing Stern v. Cosby, 645 F. Supp. 2d 258
(S.D.N.Y. 2009)).
230. Stern, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 273 (emphasis added).
231. Attitudes and actions often are related, with attitudes generally predicting
behaviors. See, e.g., Min-Sun Kim & John E. Hunter, Attitude-Behavior Relations: A
Meta-Analysis of Attitudinal Relevance and Topic, 43 J. C OMM . 101, 132 (1993)
(finding that “evidence from the accumulated literature affirms the following
position: Relevant attitudes strongly predict volitional behavior”); Nancy Rhodes et
al., Persuasion as Reinforcement: Strengthening the Pro-Environmental AttitudeBehavior Relationship Through Ecotainment Programming, 19 M EDIA P SYCHOL .
455, 459 (2016) (noting that “[a]ccessible attitudes have been found to be strongly
associated with attention, behavioral intent, and future behavior”). Because
reputational harm in libel law is reflected in both negative attitudes and behaviors
towards a plaintiff, examining both attitudes about and actions toward transgender
individuals is exceedingly relevant. See Clay Calvert, Harm to Reputation: An
Interdisciplinary Approach to the Impact of Denial of Defamatory Allegations, 26
P AC . L.J. 933, 940 (1995) (“While reputational harm may take the form of negative
attitudes and opinions, it also includes changes in physical conduct or behavior
toward the plaintiff.”).
232. A.D. Fisher et al., Who Has the Worst Attitudes Toward Sexual Minorities?
Comparison of Transphobia and Homophobia Levels in Gender Dysphoric
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Similarly, the National Center for Transgender Equality defines
transgender as “[a] term for people whose gender identity,
expression or behavior is different from those typically associated
with their assigned sex at birth. Transgender is a broad term and is
good for non-transgender people to use.”233
The notion that transgender is an expansive label is echoed by
the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) National Help
Center. It describes transgender as an:
umbrella term that includes different things, all having to do
with gender identity. This can include someone who
occasionally enjoys dressing in the clothing of the opposite
sex (cross-dresser) or someone who knows that the gender
that they feel on the inside of their body does not match the
gender that they appear to be on the outside of their body
(transsexual).234
More specifically, a transgender man is “a transgender person
who currently identifies as a man,”235 while a transgender woman is
“a transgender person who currently identifies as a woman.”236
With these definitions in mind, the pivotal issue in libel cases is
whether it is defamatory in 2018 to falsely state that someone is
transgender. In other words, is being transgender something that
might, under the California law applicable in Simmons, cause a
person to be: (1) hated, ridiculed, or treated with contempt; (2)
shunned or avoided; or (3) injured in his or her occupation?237
Although there is a paucity of comprehensive survey research in
the United States today on attitudes toward transgender
individuals,238 the answer appears to be a resounding yes.
Individuals, the General Population and Health Care Providers, 40 J.
E NDOCRINOLOGICAL I NVESTIGATION 263, 264 (2017).
233. Tips for Journalists, NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUALITY (Jan. 26,
2014),
https://transequality.org/issues/resources/fact-sheet-writing-abouttransgender-people-and-issues.
234. Frequently Asked Questions: What Does “Transgender” Mean, and What
Does It Include?, LGBT NAT’L HELP CTR., https://www.glbthotline.org/faqs.html (last
visited Oct. 31, 2018).
235. Tips for Journalists, supra note 233.
236. Id.
237. C AL . C IV . C ODE § 45 (West 2017).
238. See Andrew R. Flores et al., Challenged Expectations: Mere Exposure
Effects on Attitudes About Transgender People and Rights, 39 P OL . P SYCHOL . 197,
198 (2018) (observing that “[t]here are few studies on public attitudes about
transgender people”); Yasuko Kanamori & Jeffrey H.D. Cornelius-White, Big
Changes, but Are They Big Enough? Healthcare Professionals’ Attitudes Toward
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Transphobia is a “prejudice against gender nonconforming
persons”239 and “an emotional disgust toward”240 such individuals. It
“manifests itself in the fear that personal acquaintances may be
trans or disgust upon encountering a trans person”241 and percolates
through society.
As a 2015 article in Sociological Forum encapsulates it,
“transgender people are systematically oppressed and experience
high rates of discrimination and violence in the United States.”242
Similarly, a 2016 article in the scholarly journal Sex Roles asserts
that while “contemporary U.S. society struggles with accepting
diversity in various human characteristics, deviations from the norm
in terms of sexuality and gender tend to incite particularly strong
and persistent negative reactions.”243
There are, of course, several high-profile indicators that
transgender status is stigmatized. These include President Donald
Trump’s effort in 2017 to ban transgender people from military
service,244 as well as ongoing battles over bathroom access.245 A

Transgender Persons, 17 I NT ’ L J. T RANSGENDERISM 165, 165 (2016) (noting that
“research into attitudes toward transgender persons sorely lags behind research into
attitudes toward lesbians and gays”); Yasuko Kanamori et al., Development and
Validation of the Transgender Attitudes and Beliefs Scale, 46 A RCHIVES S EXUAL
B EHAV . 1503, 1503 (2017) (calling it “surprising to note that only five empirical
studies of U.S. attitudes toward transgender persons have been conducted in the last
decade”).
239. Kanamori et al., supra note 238, at 1504.
240. Darryl B. Hill & Brian L.B. Willoughby, The Development and Validation
of the Genderism and Transphobia Scale, 53 S EX R OLES 531, 533 (2005).
241. Id. at 533–34.
242. Lisa R. Miller & Eric Anthony Grollman, The Social Costs of Gender
Nonconformity for Transgender Adults: Implications for Discrimination and Health,
30 S OC . F. 809, 809 (2015).
243. Holger B. Elischberger et al., “Boys Don’t Cry”—or Do They? Adult
Attitudes Toward and Beliefs About Transgender Youth, 75 S EX R OLES 197, 197
(2016).
244. Julie Hirschfeld Davis & Helene Cooper, Trump Surprises Military with a
Transgender Ban, N.Y. T IMES , July 27, 2017, at A1. Trump’s effort ultimately failed.
Spencer S. Hsu & Ann E. Marimow, Judge Rejects Delay of Trans Military
Recruiting, W ASH . P OST , Dec. 12, 2017, at A3. The government’s legal efforts to stay
the trial court’s injunction against the ban were blocked by the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia. Doe v. Trump, No. 17-5267, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS
26477, at *3 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 22, 2017). Trump voluntarily dismissed his appeal in
January 2018. Doe v. Trump, No. 17-5267, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 296, at *3–4 (D.C.
Cir. Jan. 4, 2018).
245. Richard
Fausset,
Deal
on Bathroom Law
Would
Expand Transgender Protections, N.Y. T IMES , Oct. 19, 2017, at A15. See generally
Stephen Rushin & Jenny Carroll, Bathroom Laws as Status Crimes, 86 F ORDHAM L.
R EV . 1 (2017) (analyzing the legality and criminal implications of a growing number
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recent article in the New England Journal of Medicine emphasizes
that laws such as North Carolina’s now-repealed bathroom statute246
“send a message that transgender people are not welcome in
workplaces or schools, reinforcing the stigma, bias and fear that fuel
discrimination against transgender people.”247 Indeed, a 2016 Pew
Research Center study reveals that a substantial minority of those
surveyed would discriminate against transgender individuals by
requiring them to use a bathroom matching their gender at birth:
About half of U.S. adults (51%) say transgender individuals
should be allowed to use public restrooms that correspond
with the gender they currently identify with . . . . But nearly
as many (46%) take the opposite position—on the side of the
North Carolina law—and say transgender people should be
required to use bathrooms that match the gender they were
born into.248
The markers and signs that being transgender carries the
likelihood of being ridiculed, shunned, or harmed in one’s
occupation, however, stretch far beyond such legal skirmishes.
For instance, USA Today in January 2018 reported the results of
a Harris poll which found that “[f]or the first time in four years,
Americans are less accepting of LGBTQ people.”249 Specifically, 31%
of those surveyed said they would be either uncomfortable or very
uncomfortable having their child placed in a class with an LGBTQ
teacher.250 Furthermore, 31% said they would be either
uncomfortable or very uncomfortable learning their doctor was

of so-called bathroom laws that typically require individuals to use a single-sex
bathroom that matches their gender as identified on their original birth certificate).
246. See Mark Berman & Amber Phillips, N.C. Repeals Bathroom Law but Riles
Rights Groups Anew, W ASH . P OST , Mar. 31, 2017, at A2 (“North Carolina lawmakers
retreated from the state’s controversial law that restricted which public restrooms
transgender people could use, repealing it . . . in the face of economic pressure in
favor of a new bill that LGBT rights groups attacked as discriminatory.”).
247. Mark A. Schuster et al., Beyond Bathrooms—Meeting the Mental Health
Needs of Transgender People, 375 N EW E NG . J. M ED . 101, 101–02 (2016).
248. Michael Lipka, Americans Are Divided over Which Public Bathrooms
Transgender People Should Use, P EW R ES . C TR . (Oct. 3, 2016),
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/10/03/americans-are-divided-over-whichpublic-bathrooms-transgender-people-should-use/.
249. Susan Miller, Americans Show Less Acceptance of LGBTQ People, Survey
Says, USA T ODAY , Jan. 26, 2018, at 3A (emphasis added).
250. Id.
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LGBTQ.251 These figures indicate that a false allegation of being
transgender would harm one in the occupational roles of both
teacher and doctor among a respectable and significant minority of
the population.
GLAAD, the organization that commissioned the poll noted
immediately above, argues that “acceptance of LGBTQ people is
slipping, and discrimination is increasing, in the face of attacks,
bias, and erasure by the Trump administration.”252 Sarah Kate Ellis,
GLAAD’s president and chief executive officer, contends the “change
[could] be seen as a dangerous repercussion in the tenor of discourse
and experience over the last year.”253 She points here to anti-LGBTQ
headlines regarding Trump’s proposed transgender military ban,
recently confirmed Supreme Court Justice Neil Gorsuch’s opposition
to marriage equality, and the religious freedom law passed in
Mississippi.254
Marketing research firm Ipsos released a report in January 2018
that compared attitudes toward transgender individuals in sixteen
countries around the world.255 Disturbingly, it found that:
Among western countries, the United States is most likely to
believe that transgender people have a mental illness (32%)
and the most likely out of all countries surveyed to believe
that transgendered people are committing a sin (32%).
Americans are the most likely to say that society has gone too
far in allowing people to dress and live as one sex even
though they were born another (36%).256
The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights released a report in
November 2017257 that brings into high relief how being falsely
251. Id.
252. Accelerating Acceptance 2018: Executive Summary, GLAAD (2018),
http://www.glaad.org/files/aa/Accelerating%20Acceptance%202018.pdf.
253. Id.
254. Id.; see Alan Blinder, Southern Lawmakers Put Culture Wars on Hold, N.Y.
T IMES , Jan. 23, 2018, at A10 (explaining that “Mississippi passed, and has so far
successfully defended in court, a law allowing people to use their religious beliefs to
justify refusing to provide services to gay people”).
255. Global Attitudes Toward Transgender People, I PSOS (Jan. 22, 2018),
https://www.ipsos.com/sites/default/files/ct/news/documents/201801/transgender_glob
al_data_writeup_01.22.18.pdf. The sixteen countries surveyed were: Argentina,
Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hungary, Italy,
Japan, Poland, Serbia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, and the United States. Id.
256. Id.
257. U.S. C OMM ’ N ON C IVIL R IGHTS , W ORKING FOR I NCLUSION : T IME FOR
C ONGRESS TO E NACT F EDERAL L EGISLATION TO A DDRESS W ORKPLACE
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labeled transgender harms a person in his occupation:
LGBT individuals often face lower wages, increased difficulty
in finding jobs, promotion denials, and/or job terminations
due to their sexual orientation or gender identity. Studies
have found that anywhere from 21 to 47 percent of LGBT
adults faced employment discrimination because they were
gay or transgender. A summary of numerous studies of
LGBT employee survey respondents showed that ten to 28
percent reported receiving negative performance evaluations
or were passed over for promotion because they were gay or
transgender, and seven to 41 percent experienced verbal
and/or physical abuse in the workplace. More staggering is
that 90 percent of transgender employees report experiencing
some form of harassment or mistreatment on the job.258
Such hard data about workplace discrimination against
transgender individuals only scratch the surface of a deeper
problem. As a column in The New York Times recently noted:
Statistics regarding transgender people who lose their jobs
because of their gender identities reveal only the cases in
which such bias was blatant. Lost within these numbers are
the more ambiguous stories—of managers who may have
rejected a request for a uniform that reflected an employee’s
gender, workers terminated for requests to change their
names on internal documents or employees whose presence
was shown, through the actions of colleagues and superiors,
to be unwelcome.259

D ISCRIMINATION A GAINST L ESBIAN , G AY , B ISEXUAL , AND T RANSGENDER
A MERICANS
(2017)
[hereinafter
CIVIL
RIGHTS
COMMISSION
REPORT],
https://www.usccr.gov/pubs/docs/LGBT_Employment_Discrimination2017.pdf; U.S.
COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, WORKING FOR INCLUSION: TIME FOR CONGRESS TO ENACT
FEDERAL LEGISLATION TO ADDRESS WORKPLACE DISCRIMINATION AGAINST LESBIAN,
GAY,
BISEXUAL,
AND
TRANSGENDER
AMERICANS
(2017),
http://www.usccr.gov/press/2017/11-29-LGBT-PR.pdf (summarizing findings and
recommendations of the report).
258. CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 257, at 11.
259. Cyrée Jarelle Johnson, Medicaid Work Requirements Are Yet Another
Burden
for
Trans
Workers,
N.Y.
T IMES
(Feb.
5,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/05/opinion/medicaid-transgender-workers.html.
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Likewise, negative perceptions of transgender individuals can
have detrimental effects in healthcare. Although progress has been
made,260 at least eight studies dating from 1992 through 2010
revealed a positive correlation between nurses’ negative attitudes
toward LGBT patients and reduced willingness to care for them.261 A
survey conducted by the National Center for Transgender Equality
in 2015 found that one-third of transgender individuals who saw a
healthcare provider the prior year reported at least one negative
experience, such as “being refused treatment, verbally harassed, or
physically or sexually assaulted, or having to teach the provider
about transgender people in order to get appropriate care.”262
Additionally, the study reported that nearly a quarter of respondents
elected not to see a doctor, even when they needed care, because they
feared being mistreated.263
Negative attitudes toward transgender individuals often are
unintentionally communicated. A 2016 review in the Journal of Sex
Research categorizes the immense impact of microaggressions as
“subtle,
often
unconscious
forms
of
discrimination.”264
Microaggressions are further defined as “behaviors and statements,
often unconscious or unintentional, that communicate hostile or
derogatory messages, particularly to members of targeted social
groups.”265 A 2015 study found that a whopping 71% of transgender
individuals
surveyed
reported
everyday
transphobic
discrimination.266 The perpetuation of microaggressions, although
inadvertent, can lead to “a multitude of potential negative
implications.”267
Persistent intolerant behavior manifests itself in detrimental
ways among the transgender population. For example, a 2016 article
260. See Kanamori & Cornelius-White, supra note 238, at 173 (finding that
“healthcare professionals today strongly affirm the intrinsic value of transgender
persons” and that “they displayed ease in interacting with transgender persons”).
261. Caroline Dorsen, An Integrative Review of Nurse Attitudes Towards
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Patients, 44 CANADIAN J. NURSING RES. 18,
33 (2012).
262. NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL., THE REPORT OF THE 2015 U.S.
TRANSGENDER
SURVEY:
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
8
(2016),
https://transequality.org/sites/default/files/docs/usts/USTS-Executive-SummaryDec17.pdf.
263. Id.
264. Kevin L. Nadal et al., Microaggressions Toward Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual,
Transgender, Queer, and Genderqueer People: A Review of the Literature, 53 J. SEX
RES. 488, 488 (2016).
265. Id.
266. Miller & Grollman, supra note 242, at 817.
267. Nadal et al., supra note 264, at 488.
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in the New England Journal of Medicine links discrimination to
“increased stress, anxiety, depressive symptoms, post-traumatic
stress disorder, substance abuse, and suicide”268 among transgender
victims.
In fact, multiple studies from the past decade demonstrate that
targeted prejudice often leads to post-traumatic stress disorder,
higher rates of depression, and anxiety.269 In their 2017 article
published in the Journal of Clinical Nursing, Edward McCann and
Michael Brown conclude that “transgender people continue to
experience ongoing and significant challenges in terms of their social
inclusion, discrimination, sexual identity, social isolation and the
associated impact on their mental health and the development of
mental illness.”270
Psychologist Holger Elischberger and his colleagues suggest that
“[p]rogress on transgender issues lags farther behind, perhaps owing
to the small number of transgendered people, which has translated
into less visibility and advocacy, at least up until very recently.”271
Political scientist Andrew Flores echoes this sentiment, noting that
“[t]he transgender community did not emerge as an organized
political movement in the United States until the 1990s.”272 In other
words, the gay rights movement has a much longer history in the
United States and has, in turn, been able to influence and change
public opinion over a greater period of time.

268. Schuster et al., supra note 247, at 102.
269. See Walter O. Bockting et al., Stigma, Mental Health, and Resilience in an
Online Sample of the US Transgender Population, 103 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 943, 943
(2013) (finding that transgender “[r]espondents had a high prevalence of clinical
depression (44.1%), anxiety (33.2%), and somatization (27.5%)” and that “[s]ocial
stigma was positively associated with psychological distress”); Stephanie L. Budge &
Jill L. Adelson, Anxiety and Depression in Transgender Individuals: The Roles of
Transition Status, Loss, Social Support, and Coping, 81 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL
PSYCHOL. 545, 545 (2013) (acquiring “[t]he rates of depressive symptoms (51.4% for
transgender women; 48.3% for transgender men) and anxiety (40.4% for transgender
women; 47.5% for transgender men) within the current study far surpass the rates of
those for the general population”); Jillian C. Shipherd et al., Potentially Traumatic
Events in a Transgender Sample: Frequency and Associated Symptoms, 17
TRAUMATOLOGY 56, 56 (2011) (concluding that “transgender individuals endorsed
high prevalence of PTE [potentially traumatic event] exposure along with elevated
PTSD [post-traumatic stress disorder] and depressive symptoms, when compared to
other traumatized populations”).
270. Edward McCann & Michael Brown, Discrimination and Resilience and the
Needs of People Who Identify as Transgender: A Narrative Review of Quantitative
Research Studies, 26 J. CLINICAL NURSING 4080, 4091 (2017).
271. Elischberger et al., supra note 243, at 197.
272. Flores et al., supra note 238, at 198.
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Recent data from the first national probability sample of
heterosexual U.S. adults indicated widespread negative attitudes
regarding transgender individuals and attributed its results to
Americans’ binary conception of gender.273 These views stem from
deep-seated societal standards reinforced by “psychological
authoritarianism, political conservatism and anti-egalitarianism,
and (for women) religiosity,”274 as well as a general “lack of personal
contact with sexual minorities.”275
Sociologists Laurel Westbrook and Kristen Schilt coined the term
“gender panics” as a result of society’s inability to reconcile how
transgender men and women fit into gender-divided spaces.276 They
define gender panics as “situations where people react to disruptions
to biology-based gender ideology by frantically reasserting the
naturalness of a male-female binary” such as recent public restroom
debates.277
Critically, courts openly acknowledge the discrimination and
stigma today that are attached to being transgender. Writing in
2015 in Adkins v. City of New York,278 U.S. District Judge Jed Rakoff
opined that “transgender people have suffered a history of
persecution and discrimination. . . . Moreover, this history of
persecution and discrimination is not yet history.”279 Rakoff added
that “transgender people often face backlash in everyday life when
their status is discovered.”280
Additionally, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
observed the same year that “transgender persons are caught in the
crosshairs of both generalized homophobia and transgender-specific
violence and discrimination.”281 Similarly, a federal district court in
Wisconsin recognized in 2014 that “[d]espite the strides in
acceptance that transgender and intersex persons have made in
American society, it is unfortunately true that they have been

273. Aaron T. Norton & Gregory M. Herek, Heterosexuals’ Attitudes Toward
Transgender People: Findings from a National Probability Sample of U.S. Adults, 68
SEX ROLES 738, 739 (2013).
274. Id. at 749.
275. Id. at 738.
276. Laurel Westbrook & Kristen Schilt, Transgender People, Gender Panics,
and the Maintenance of the Sex/Gender/Sexuality System, 28 GENDER & SOC’Y 32,
34 (2014).
277. Id.
278. 143 F. Supp. 3d 134 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
279. Id. at 139.
280. Id. at 140.
281. Avendano-Hernandez v. Lynch, 800 F.3d 1072, 1081 (9th Cir. 2015).
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unfairly stigmatized, and that someone publically [sic] labeled a
hermaphrodite could, however unjustly, face a loss of reputation.”282
Viewed collectively, all of these data points, surveys,
observations, and other pieces of evidence readily help to answer the
question posed in the opening paragraph of this Part: unlike recent
shifts in opinions about homosexuals, there has been neither a
“tremendous evolution”283 nor a “veritable sea change”284 in societal
attitudes toward transgender individuals that is sufficient—at least,
standing alone—to jettison false allegations of transgender status
from the province of defamatory per se statements.
With this review of the persistent negative attitudes and actions
that transgender individuals confront today in mind, the Article next
turns to the Conclusion. It proposes variables for judicial
consideration in cases such as Simmons where the legal system’s
desire not to endorse or ratify prejudice and discrimination conflicts
with an individual’s need to recover damages stemming from harm
wrought by that same prejudice and discrimination.
CONCLUSION
This Article examined the 2017 decision in Simmons v. American
Media, Inc. regarding defamation per se and transgender status. The
Article situated Judge Gregory Keosian’s ruling against fitness
aficionado Richard Simmons within a broad framework. That
context included both case law and legal scholarship on the
imperfect, ill-fitting analogy to false allegations of homosexuality,285
given that gender identity and sexual orientation simply are not the
same.286 Additionally, the Article offered social science data,
government reports, and scholarly articles describing attitudes and
actions towards transgender individuals in the United States.287
As Part III evidenced, transphobia remains a stubborn, troubling
problem. Transgender adults and minors288 routinely confront
282. Mitchell v. Price, No. 11-cv-260-wmc, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171561, at *39
(W.D. Wis. Dec. 10, 2014).
283. Yonaty v. Mincolla, 945 N.Y.S.2d 774, 778 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012).
284. Stern v. Cosby, 645 F. Supp. 2d 258, 273 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
285. Supra Part II.B.
286. Supra notes 85–91 and accompanying text.
287. Supra Part III.
288. Battles over bathroom access in public schools in 2018 bring home the
point about the seemingly bigoted attitudes and actions of many Americans toward
transgender minors. See Moriah Balingit, Education Dept. Isn’t Investigating
Bathroom Cases, W ASH . P OST , Feb. 14, 2018, at A4 (“The Education Department
confirmed this week that it is no longer investigating civil rights complaints from
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stigma and discrimination. Data described in Part III clearly
indicate that a false allegation of transgender status today harms a
person’s reputation in the eyes of a considerable and respectable
minority of the population—the gold standard for defamatory
meaning in American libel law.289
There simply has not been the same type of positive change in
attitudes and actions toward transgender individuals that there has
been in recent decades toward gays and lesbians. As a 2017 article in
Political Research Quarterly reported, “the public is less likely to
support discrimination protections for transgender people in
comparison with gay men and lesbians,”290 and people “on average,
expressed warmer feelings toward gays and lesbians compared with
transgender people.”291 The researchers added that “[w]hile attitudes
toward gays and lesbians have become increasingly positive in
recent years, feelings toward transgender people remain cooler.”292
Judges in defamation cases who nonchalantly gloss over the
differences between attitudes toward gays and lesbians, on the one
hand, and transgender individuals, on the other, are mistaken.
Simmons v. American Media, Inc., thus, sits at a dangerous
intersection. Consider it a crossroads where a noble judicial desire to
reject prejudicial stereotypes and to embrace equality collides headon with an ignoble reality in which a significant minority of the
population finds a false allegation (in Simmons, transgender status)
to be defamatory. The wreckage, in turn, is reputational injury.
What should a judge do in this situation? Sacrifice the reputation
of an individual plaintiff like Richard Simmons at the altar of a
larger societal good of equality? Or allow a plaintiff to recover today
and postpone until later—after public opinion and attitudes have
meaningfully and measurably shifted and solidified in a positive
direction—before sending an egalitarian signal? In other words,
when should a judge, faced with the discomfiting fact that a
substantial minority of the population still views a particular
characteristic with disdain and disgust, nonetheless jettison that
characteristic from defamatory per se status?

transgender students barred from school bathrooms that match their gender
identity, a development those students say leaves them vulnerable to bullying and
violence.”) (emphasis added).
289. Supra Part II.A.
290. Daniel C. Lewis et al., Degrees of Acceptance: Variation in Public Attitudes
Toward Segments of the LGBT Community, 70 P OL . R ES . Q. 861, 871 (2017).
291. Id.
292. Id. at 872.
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There is no easy answer. A central problem here is that “norms
do not change overnight nor are they susceptible to easy
quantification.”293 Judges like Gregory Keosian rightfully do not
want to endorse bigotry and hatred. The natural temptation for
judges, therefore, is to take large leaps forward, changing
defamation law overnight to promote the greater good of equality.
Are there factors a judge might weigh in deciding whether it is
too early or too soon to declare that a particular false label does not
merit defamatory per se status? A logical starting point is for a judge
to consider methodologically sound survey data, government reports,
and peer-reviewed scholarly articles regarding attitudes and actions
toward individuals who possess the allegedly defamatory
characteristic or trait. For example, Part III of this Article set forth
multiple data points reflecting public sentiment about and
discrimination against individuals who are transgender.
When reviewing such data, judges should examine several items.
First and foremost, they should search for evidence of how a false
allegation of possessing the characteristic in question detrimentally
affects individuals in their occupations and professions. That is
imperative because many states such as California—the venue for
Simmons—define a defamatory statement in terms of one with “a
tendency to injure him in his occupation.”294 In other words, a false
allegation that harms a person in his job is a core facet of libel law.
More specifically, it is a key feature of statements traditionally
deemed defamatory per se.295 Sacrificing a person’s ability to earn a

293. Ardia, supra note 221, at 298.
294. C AL . C IV . C ODE § 45 (West 2017); see, e.g., M ONT . C ODE A NN . § 27-1-802
(2017) (“Libel is a false and unprivileged publication by writing, printing, picture,
effigy, or other fixed representation that exposes any person to hatred, contempt,
ridicule, or obloquy or causes a person to be shunned or avoided or that has a
tendency to injure a person in the person’s occupation.”) (emphasis added); O KLA .
S TAT . tit. 12, § 1441 (2017) (defining libel, in pertinent part, as a statement that
tends to “to injure him in his occupation”); S.D. C ODIFIED L AWS § 20-11-3 (2017)
(“Libel is a false and unprivileged publication by writing, printing, picture, effigy, or
other fixed representation to the eye which exposes any person to hatred, contempt,
ridicule, or obloquy, or which causes him to be shunned or avoided, or which has a
tendency to injure him in his occupation.”) (emphasis added).
295. See, e.g., Harriss v. Metropolis Co., 160 So. 205, 207 (Fla. 1935) (holding
that a statement is libelous per se if it “naturally and necessarily tend[s] to degrade
or to expose a person to distrust, hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or to cause
him to be avoided or tend to injure him in his occupation, business, or employment”)
(emphasis added); Scott v. Harrison, 2 S.E.2d 1, 3 (N.C. 1939) (“Had she been
presently so employed, there is no question but that the words complained of, in the
connection used, would be actionable per se as words tending to bring her into
disrepute and injure her in her occupation.”) (emphasis added); Spangler v. Glover,
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living in the name of promoting equality is somewhat troubling.
Occupational harm is far greater than just not having as many
friends or pals due to a false allegation. It severely affects the ability
to fiscally survive.
It also is important to note that the phrasing of California’s
statute simply involves a mere tendency to harm a person in his
occupation.296 By comparison, this is not as high of a threshold such
as substantially likely to harm or directly harm. In other words, the
legal bar is set low for a statement to be considered defamatory in
terms of it detrimentally affecting one’s occupation or business. This,
in turn, should make a judge proceed cautiously before stripping a
particular allegation of defamatory per se status. If the bar for
harming one’s occupation is set low by statute (and thus legislative
fiat), then a judge risks encroaching on the province of the legislative
branch by removing from defamatory per se status an allegation
that, in fact, tends to harm a person in his occupation. As addressed
in Part III, a 2017 report by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights
clearly reveals how transgender status tends to harm individuals in
their occupations.297 This suggests Keosian erred by rejecting the
notion that false allegations of transgender status are defamatory
per se.
Second, judges should scrutinize the data for clear and decisive
evidence that societal attitudes have shifted positively toward the
particular trait or characteristic. Such an evidentiary standard is
akin to the “clear and convincing evidence”298 test for proving actual
malice299 in defamation law. Relying on only one or two studies
simply may not be sufficient to prove such an evolution or movement

313 P.2d 354, 357 (Wash. 1957) (holding that “[e]very publication by writing which
tends to expose any living person to hatred, contempt, ridicule or obloquy, or to
deprive him of the benefit of public confidence or social intercourse or to injure him
in his business or occupation, is libelous per se,” and adding that “[d]efamatory words
spoken of a person, which in themselves prejudice him in his profession, trade,
vocation, or office, are slanderous and actionable per se unless they are either true or
privileged”) (emphasis added).
296. C AL . C IV . C ODE § 45 (West 2017).
297. Supra notes 257–58 and accompanying text.
298. See Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 773 (1986) (noting that
the “clear and convincing” standard is a reformulation of “convincing clarity”);
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 30 (1971) (asserting that “New York
Times held that in a civil libel action by a public official against a newspaper those
guarantees required clear and convincing proof that a defamatory falsehood alleged
as libel was” published with actual malice) (emphasis added).
299. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964) (defining
actual malice as a statement published “with knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not”).
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is clear and decisive. Obviously, the greater the number of studies,
the more justified a judge’s decision would be to remove an
allegation from defamatory per se status.
Third, the pattern of positive progress should be sustained over a
significant amount of time—perhaps five years or even a decade—to
ensure the change in opinion is neither anomalous nor fleeting.
Stripping a particular allegation of defamatory per se status should
not be based, in other words, on an aberration.
In addition to examining data on public opinion and
discrimination, judges should look beyond the confines of defamation
law to analyze what other courts are saying about the particular
characteristic or trait in non-defamation cases. It will be recalled, for
instance, that several courts in disputes other than libel cases have
described the hostility and stigma that transgender individuals face
today.300
Finally, judges should be cautious about making and using
analogies to other types of assertions that once were—but no longer
are—defamatory per se. Keosian seemingly gave short shrift to the
differences between homosexuality and transgender status. He
reconciled the distinction in a single, brief sentence: “Although there
is no connection between homosexuality and being transgender, both
characteristics relate to sex and gender.”301 As this Article made
clear, societal views about sexual orientation and gender identity are
not equivalent.302
The suggestions proffered here, of course, will not end the
predicament judges face when considering whether to eliminate—in
the name of endorsing principles of equality—defamatory per se
status for allegations a significant minority of the population find
defamatory. They might, however, add rigor and a more systematic
approach to the process. And if that proves to be the case, then
Richard Simmons’ lawsuit against the National Enquirer will have
been about far more than either just an individual battle to recover
for reputational injury or a larger fight for LGBTQ rights. It will
have helped judges in similar future cases to determine if and when
it is appropriate to deny defamatory per se status to a false label or
assertion.

300.
301.
302.

Supra notes 278–82 and accompanying text.
Simmons Order, supra note 5, at 8.
Supra notes 85–91 and accompanying text.

